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Abstract 
Human compliance in cybersecurity continues to be 
a persistent problem for organizations. This research-
in-progress advances theoretical understanding of the 
negative effects of trust formed between individuals 
and the cybersecurity function (i.e., those responsible 
for protection), cybersecurity system (i.e., the 
protective technologies), and organization (i.e., those 
verifying (e.g., hiring, championing, vouching.) the 
cybersecurity department) that leads to suboptimal 
compliance behaviors. In contrast to the current 
information security literature that focuses on how 
organizations can induce compliance, this study begins 
to provide understanding into the degradation of 
compliance through organizational actions. 
Additionally, understanding is provided on how to 
combat the negative effects of trust. An integrated 
model is conceptualized using the theories of trust and 
attention. This model provides the theoretical 
foundation to study the role of dark side trust in the 
context of cybersecurity and provides initial 
mechanisms to reduce it. By developing this 
conceptualization of dark side trust and model, this 
study contributes to the general study of trust in 
information systems research outside of the domain of 
cybersecurity.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Organizations are increasingly developing more 
complex cybersecurity ecosystems that rely on people, 
technology, and processes to function effectively [34]. 
Information security research (ISec) has identified the 
criticality of studying human compliance behavior in 
cybersecurity ecosystems [8]. ISec research studied 
human compliance using a rich theoretical base such as 
deterrence [10, 39], motivation [7, 23], fear [22], 
accountability [44], and mindfulness [21]. 
Interestingly, there has been little research attention 
directed at the role of trust in human compliance in the 
context of cybersecurity.    
Trust in information systems (IS) research has 
largely been shown to be positive in different contexts 
such as electronic markets [2], e-commerce [40], 
website design [9], and online social networks [3]. 
Trust though has also been conceptualized and shown 
to result in negative consequences [12, 34, 37, 50] as 
individuals may maintain trust unconditionally and 
over and above evidence to the contrary [12]. Trust, 
therefore, has been shown to have a “bright” and 
“dark” side stimulating both positive and negative 
consequences for individuals and organizations. 
Similar to the context of project management, trust like 
commitment can be beneficial and detrimental. 
Escalating commitment can lead to detrimental 
consequences by continually absorbing resources 
without delivering benefits [24, 25]. Trust like 
commitment can potentially lead to detrimental 
consequences in contexts rife with risk, uncertainty, 
and vulnerability like cybersecurity. 
The dark side of trust, which we refer to as when an 
individual maintains trust unconditionally despite 
contradictory relevant stimuli, is important in the 
context of cybersecurity as it can be detrimental to the 
defense of cyber-attacks. For example, in 
cybersecurity, one with dark side trust may trust that 
the cybersecurity system will filter all phishing emails 
and therefore not correctly identify malicious emails 
even though stimuli (e.g., an unsecure domain, 
incorrect domain address, request for urgent 
confidential) should alert them otherwise. Conversely, 
bright side trust, when an individual maintains trust 
until presented with contradictory relevant stimuli, can 
be beneficial. Individuals with bright side trust, 
contrarily, may identify a malicious email that 
bypasses cybersecurity countermeasures when 
presented with stimuli that alert them the email is 
unsafe.  
Trust, be it dark or bright, is a highly relevant 
mechanism in understanding mitigation of uncertainty 
between people, organizations, and technology [33]. 
When individuals are in situations of uncertainty, risk, 
and vulnerability, like during cyber-attacks they tend to 
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rely on agents (e.g., cybersecurity department, 
cybersecurity system) they trust to guide behaviors. 
When relying on trusting agents it is conceivable that it 
may result in negative outcomes thus trust’s dark side 
manifests. In this research-in-progress, we provide 
understanding of the role of dark side trust in high-risk 
contexts like cybersecurity as the consequences can be 
detrimental to the individual, organization, and society 
as a whole. 
ISec research has a rich theoretical and practical 
understanding of how to facilitate compliance through 
mechanisms such as motivation [22, 23], 
accountability [44, 45], and deterrence[10, 16, 39], 
amongst others. Interestingly, existing ISec research 
has yet to fully understand how organizations can 
inhibit human compliance through mechanisms like 
dark side trust as implied above. In this research-in-
progress study, we investigate the dark side of trust in 
cybersecurity and its inhibiting effect on human 
compliance. In doing so, we develop a conceptual 
model on cybersecurity trust, attention to 
cybersecurity, and compliance behaviors. We examine 
the following research question: 
 
How does dark side trust inhibit compliance in the 
context of cybersecurity?   
 
This research-in-progress contributes to ISec 
literature and practice in several ways. This research 
builds upon dark side trust in the context of 
cybersecurity [34] by studying its effect on attention 
paid to cybersecurity as a mechanism to reduce 
compliance. This begins to provide understanding of 
how organizations can inadvertently reduce 
compliance.   Insight is also provided into the 
moderating roles of cybersecurity mindfulness, 
suspicion, and intention to protect between trust and 
attention and how they can combat dark side trust. The 
study also contributes to the IS literature in general, by 
building upon the pervious conceptualizations of the 
nuances of trust, that trust is not always beneficial. 
From a practical perspective, this study will enable 
Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), 
cybersecurity managers, and system designers to 
understand how to protect against dark side trust in 
cybersecurity. By providing understanding into the 
moderating role of cybersecurity mindfulness, 
suspicion, and intention to protect this study allows 
cybersecurity stakeholders to incorporate these three 
levers into training and system design to increase 
attention for compliance and alleviate the dark side of 
trust detrimental consequences.  
 
2. Trust In Cybersecurity  
 
Trusting relationships have been studied from four 
primary perspectives between 1) people and groups 2) 
people and organizations 3) organizations, and 4) 
people and technology [38]. Cybersecurity and proper 
defense though relies on the individual trusting the 
technology (i.e., cybersecurity system), people (i.e., 
cybersecurity department), and the organization. Each 
of these trusting agents can deploy cybersecurity 
countermeasures that an individual can rely on to 
prevent and defend against cyber-attacks.  
In the context of cybersecurity, an organization can 
develop legal strategies to prosecute, terminate, or 
discipline individuals to use fear to motivate 
identification and protective behaviors. The 
cybersecurity function can provide training for 
individuals to call upon to identify and protect against 
a cyber-attack. The cybersecurity system can filter and 
identify malicious files or emails to warn and notify the 
user of potential harm. Collectively, these different 
trusting agents can shape the individual’s trusting 
beliefs about cybersecurity. We, therefore, posit that 
trust in cybersecurity is a multidimensional 
superordinate construct comprised of trust in the 
cybersecurity function, cybersecurity system, and 
organization (Figure 1). 
In conceptualizing trust in cybersecurity as a 
multidimensional superordinate construct we adapt and 
 
Figure 1. Trust in Cybersecurity as Multidimensional Superordinate Construct 
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contextualize items for trust in the cybersecurity 
function, trust in the organization, as well as develop 
new measures and dimensions for trust in a 
cybersecurity system. Trust in the cybersecurity 
function relates to those responsible for protecting the 
individual with the dimensions of benevolence, 
competence, and reliability [15, 30, 38, 40]. 
Institutional trust in cybersecurity relates to the beliefs 
the individual has about cybersecurity in the 
organizational protective context [29] with the 
dimensions of situational normality and structural 
assurances. Trust in the cybersecurity system relates to 
how the individual believes he or she is safeguarded by 
protective technologies from a cyber-attack [29]. 
 Trust in the cybersecurity function was adapted 
from trust in a specific technology. Trust in a specific 
technology was conceptualized as users’ perceptions of 
technology attributes. McKnight et al. [29] included 
system-like constructs of reliability, functionality, and 
helpfulness, which were derived from integrity, 
competence, and predictability [29]. Similar to the 
conceptualization of trust in a specific technology we 
argue that trust in cybersecurity system elicits different 
system-like attributes since it primarily serves as a 
protective technology. We adapt new dimensions that 
are derived from reliability, functionality, and 
helpfulness and incorporate the CIA triad 
(confidentiality, integrity, availability) of security into 
trust in cybersecurity system dimensions of reliability, 
confidentiality, and availability (Table 1). Reliability is 
the assurance that confidential information and 
computing resources are protected. Confidentiality is 
that access to confidential information and computing 
resources is restricted to only those who need it. 
Availability is the guarantee of access to confidential 
information and computing resources by authorized 
persons when necessary. Overall we posit that this new 
conceptualization of trust in cybersecurity reflects the 
holistic socio-technical nature of trust in various 
cybersecurity countermeasures elicited by different 
facets of the organization. 
 
 
2.1 Dark Side Trust in Cybersecurity  
 
When an individual extends trust they are 
effectively assuming risk, uncertainty, and making 
himself or herself vulnerable to the trustee [11, 18, 33]. 
Establishing trust allows an individual to close 
informational gaps in situations of risk, uncertainty, 
and vulnerability by abdicating responsibility to the 
trustee [15]. This indicates that issues of concern like 
uncertainty and risk can be quelled when trust is placed 
in a trustor.   
 In mitigating uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability IS 
research has found that trust is a key factor in reducing 
concerns of information privacy, information security, 
and opportunism concerns in an e-commerce context 
[33]. Taking an agency perspective, in the context of e-
commerce, Pavlou et al. [33] found that sellers send 
signals by posting information security policies, 
explaining information security technologies, and third 
party-verification of information security practices. 
These pre-contract signals, in turn, lead to trusting 
beliefs by buyers and mitigate information security 
concerns. Pavlou et al. [33] also found post-contract 
incentives play a role as high-quality sellers have 
reason to safeguard information security due to 
reputational concerns. Similarly, in the context of 
cybersecurity, the cybersecurity function sends trusting 
signals and has incentives to mitigate cyber-attacks in 
the organization. For example, the cybersecurity 
function implements information security and safe 
computing policies, explains the purpose of and 
provides protective technologies via the cybersecurity 
system, and the organization verifies the cybersecurity 
function and system via support. Additionally, the 
cybersecurity function has incentives to mitigate cyber-
attacks due to reputational concerns.  
Frequently, individuals are tasked with the making 
decisions fraught with uncertainty, risk, and 
vulnerability during the course of cyber-attacks.  Trust 
allows individuals to reduce feelings of uncertainty, 
risk, and vulnerability by placing trust in the 
cybersecurity function, system, and/or the 
organization. For example, social engineered cyber-
Table 1. Trust in cybersecurity system dimensions 
Trust Between People (McKnight et 
al. 2011) 
Trust in a Specific Technology 
(McKnight et al. 2011) 
Trust in a Cybersecurity System 
(This paper) 
Competence – The efficacy of the 
trustee to fulfill a promise in terms of 
their ability or power to do something 
for us (McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5) 
Functionality - whether one expects a 
technology to have the capacity or 
capability to complete a required task 
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5) 
Confidentiality  -  access to 
confidential information and 
computing resources is restricted to 
only those who need it 
Benevolence – When the trustee cares 
enough to offer help when needed 
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5) 
Helpfulness – if the help function of 
the technology is adequate and 
responsive (McKnight et al. 2011, p. 
12:5) 
Availability -  the guarantee of 
access to confidential information 
and computing resources by 
authorized persons when 
necessary 
Integrity – The hope that trustees are 
consistent, predictable, and reliable 
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5) 
Reliability – the technology works 
consistently and predictably 
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5) 
Reliability -  the assurance that 
confidential information and 
computing resources are protected Page 4266
attack like phishing attempt to psychological 
manipulate individuals by acting as a trusted entity 
[19]. Individuals, when faced with a socially 
engineered phishing email, may defer the decision 
regarding if the email is safe to a trusting agent. They 
may trust that 1) the cybersecurity system did not filter 
the email therefore the email is safe, 2) the 
cybersecurity function did not block the sender or 
notify of phishing threats therefore the email is safe, 
and 3) the intimate details of the operation of the 
organization or branding are in the context of the email 
therefore it is safe. While these may raise red flags and 
elicit the bright side of trust in enacting proper defense 
(e.g., checking the domain for safety, reviewing the 
sender email address rather than relying on the email 
header, etc.) there may also be negative consequences 
due to the dark side of trust. The dark side of trust 
could manifest resulting in the failure of the individual 
to identify the phishing email as they abdicate 
responsibility to trusting agents. This could result in 
the individual providing confidential information (e.g., 
username and passwords), downloading a malicious 
file, or even responding and wiring funds to a 
cybercriminal. 
Overall, the dark side of trust in management 
literature has been found to have negative 
consequences for individuals and organizations such as 
allowing unethical behavior [50], overreliance on 
automation [27], poor judgment [13], management 
complacency [26], and underperformance [32]. In light 
of this understanding in management literature, little 
attention has been paid to the dark side of trust in ISec 
and IS research. The dark side of trust therefore, could 
have negative consequences in high-risk situations like 
cybersecurity as it may alleviate individuals’ 
cybersecurity concerns in an organization and reduce 
compliance behaviors. 
  
3. Attention to Cybersecurity  
 
Cybersecurity is riddled with failures of the human 
element with almost 90 percent of attacks relying on 
deceiving humans [52]. For example, the Equifax data 
breach of 2017 could have been avoided had humans 
updated security patches when released in March 2017. 
The cyber-attack was launched from May to June 
2017, yet the breach was not discovered until the end 
of July 2017 and by that time it is estimated 143 
million records had been breached [53].   
One of the primary purposes of cybersecurity 
ecosystems is the detection and identification of 
malicious cyber-attacks [31]. These systems rely on 
socio-technical countermeasures to detect, identify, and 
respond in mitigating an attack. Cybersecurity systems 
use technical means like information security warnings 
to engage users and elicit pro-cybersecurity behaviors 
[43]. Recently, ISec research has turned to collective 
intelligence via knowledge management systems to 
leverage the human element by creating human 
firewalls in identifying malicious email [20]. 
Leveraging humans and engaging them as an effective 
countermeasure has proven elusive since it requires 
them to pay attention to information security warnings, 
phishing emails, information security training, and 
notifications [21, 36, 45, 48, 49]. 
When humans, a key component of cybersecurity 
defense, fail to detect cyber-attacks that bypass 
technical countermeasures the individual and 
organization are subject to detrimental consequences. 
ISec research has found that security is not a priority 
for individuals [17]. Additionally, there is little 
understanding of basic cybersecurity and associated 
countermeasures [51]. Inherently, this shows that 
individuals are not concerned about cybersecurity or do 
not understand it.  
To combat the tendency to ignore cybersecurity, 
ISec research has turned its attention to how 
individuals tune out information security warnings [1, 
43, 45]. In a series of studies, it was found that over 
time individuals become habituated to repeated 
security warnings and thus fail to engage with them. 
Polymorphic design of information security warnings 
was found to decrease habituation and increase 
adherence to said warnings [1, 43]. This research 
shows that individuals over time are vulnerable to 
paying less attention to information security warnings. 
Thus garnering the attention of individuals in 
cybersecurity is critical in the effective detection, 
response, and mitigation of cyber-attacks.   
 
4. Compliance 
  
Human compliance in cybersecurity has received 
substantial attention from a diverse array of theoretical 
lenses, yet is still an elusive problem for academics and 
practice. As stated previously, ISec research has noted 
the criticality of behavioral security and the importance 
of inducing compliance behaviors in the effective 
defense of cyber-attacks. [8]. 
Security compliance policies and associated 
security education, training, and awareness programs 
are designed to provide guidance for individuals to 
protect the organization [22]. A commonality amongst 
these policies and programs is that it allows the 
cybersecurity function to articulate and demonstrate 
expectations for individual pro-cybersecurity 
behaviors.  When individuals fail to engage in these 
compliance behaviors the organization is at risk. 
Although, we have a rich understanding of what drives 
compliance behaviors theoretically such as fear [22], 
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accountability [44], and deterrence [10], ISec research 
regarding what lessens these behaviors is still relatively 
new. Therefore, understanding what diminishes 
individuals to engage in cybersecurity compliance, like 
dark side trust is important for future ISec research.    
  
5. Cybersecurity Mindfulness, 
Cybersecurity Suspicion, and Intention to 
Protect 
  
Mindfulness and suspicion are concepts that are 
similar in that they engage users in cognitive activation 
[5, 6, 20, 41]. Although similar, there are distinct 
individual differences between the constructs in that 
mindfulness does not require the element of malicious 
intent, while suspicion does. For instance, an 
individual can engage in mindful behaviors even if 
they do not sense they will be harmed, while suspicion 
does not rise unless the individual believes they will be 
harmed. Mindfulness invokes engagement with users 
in one dimension through awareness of multiple 
perspectives [41]. Conversely, suspicion invokes 
engagement through the dimension of cognitive 
activation, where the individual mentally conjectures 
multiple explanations for harm [6]. For instance, in 
identifying phishing emails an individual that is 
mindful might engage in the multiple perspectives 
related to past compliance training, while an individual 
that is suspicious may inherently question all emails 
looking for alternative explanations of why the email 
can be harming above and beyond what he or she has 
been trained for. Regardless, both mindfulness and 
suspicion in cybersecurity further engage individuals in 
deeper thinking. 
Individuals with an intention to protect may be 
more likely to engage in compliance behaviors. 
Intention has been shown to be a key factor in driving 
behavior [46, 47]. Past ISec and IS research has shown 
the strength of this relationship and those that have a 
positive behavioral intention are more likely to engage 
in subsequent behaviors [7, 23, 36, 46, 47]. Therefore, 
those that have an intention to protect may be more 
likely to engage in more concentrated efforts for 
cybersecurity.  
 
6. Research Model  
 
 We draw on the theoretical bases of trust, 
attention, and compliance behaviors to build an 
integrative model of the consequences of dark side 
trust in cybersecurity (Figure 2).  In this view, we 
propose that dark side trust in cybersecurity lessens 
attention to cybersecurity and subsequent compliance 
behaviors. Bright trust, in general, has been shown as a 
mechanism that lessens concern in situations of 
uncertainty, vulnerability, and risk for beneficial 
consequences [33]. This model, in turn, posits that dark 
side trust can have the same effects in that it can 
alleviate concerns for cybersecurity causing individuals 
attention to cybersecurity to decrease and thus making 
them more susceptible to cyber-attacks since security 
compliance behaviors are not followed. Table 2 
presents the model constructs and definitions. 
Trust and its beneficial side is shown to have 
positive outcomes in the contexts of e-commerce [2, 
33, 40], social networks [3], and recommendation 
agents [4].  In these contexts, trust has been shown to 
mitigate uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability leading to 
improved exchanges between the trustee and the 
trustor. Specifically, Pavlou et al. [33] found that trust 
mitigated uncertainty related to information security in 
online shopping. Customers’ perceptions of risk in 
information security were reduced the more they 
trusted the organization thus increasing purchasing 
intentions [33]. Similar to this dark side trust can 
mitigate individuals concerns for cybersecurity in an 
organization due to trust in cybersecurity.  
We suspect that individuals may not be concerned 
about cybersecurity in the organization since they trust 
the cybersecurity function, system, and organization 
prevent cyber-attacks. Therefore, individuals may not 
pay attention to cybersecurity since they trust 
 
Figure 2. Dark side trust research model 
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cybersecurity agents in the organization will have 
taken care of mitigating cyber-attacks. Additionally, 
trust in cybersecurity may cause individuals not to 
engage in cybersecurity compliance behaviors again 
since it is not of their concern.   
 
H1: The dark side of trust in cybersecurity has a 
negative (i.e., de-intensifies) relationship with a) 
attention to cybersecurity and b) compliance in 
protection. 
 
Cybersecurity mindfulness, suspicion, and an 
individual’s intention to protect all may increase the 
level of attention an individual directs at cybersecurity. 
Cybersecurity mindfulness and suspicion have both 
been shown to increase the identification of cyber-
attacks. Jensen et al. [21] showed that training 
individuals in phishing mindfulness increases their 
ability to avoid falling victim to phishing attacks. Gay 
et al. [14] found increasing suspicion in military drone 
vehicles lead to an improvement in identifying and 
mitigating cyber-attacks on the systems running the 
drones. As noted previously, each of these constructs 
includes cognitive activation that engages the user, 
mindfulness through multiple perspectives in training 
compliance and suspicion through cognitively 
assessing a harmful situation for alternative 
explanations for how, when, and why a cyber-attack is 
happening thus eliciting vulnerability. Intention to 
protect has also been shown in IS research to be a 
positive predictor of behavior. We therefore posit that 
cybersecurity mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to 
protect will negatively moderate the relationship 
between dark side trust and attention to cybersecurity. 
 
H2a: Cybersecurity mindfulness negatively moderates 
(i.e., de-intensifies) the relationship between the dark 
side of trust in cybersecurity and attention to 
cybersecurity. 
 
H2b: Cybersecurity suspicion negatively moderates 
(i.e., de-intensifies) the relationship between dark side 
of trust in cybersecurity and attention to cybersecurity. 
 
H2c: Intention to protect negatively moderates (i.e, de-
intensifies) the relationship between the dark side of 
trust in cybersecurity and attention to cybersecurity. 
 
Getting members in an organization to pay attention 
to cybersecurity is a concern for ISec researchers and 
practice.  Vance et al. [43] showed that individuals 
over time stop paying attention over time to 
information security warnings as they become 
habituated to them. By changing design principles in 
the information security warning they showed that 
individuals were more attentive to the warning. 
Practice has also shown that although cybersecurity is 
a concern and widely prevalent in organizations a large 
number of people do not understand basic concepts 
[51].  
Garnering individuals’ attention toward 
cybersecurity is therefore important in eliciting 
compliance in protection. For instance, those that pay 
attention to phishing emails may identify them and 
subsequently forward them to the cybersecurity 
function or flag them within the system.  Although, 
those that do not pay attention may not engage in 
requested compliance behaviors such as appropriately 
reporting a phishing email. This is important to ISec 
research as newer streams have shown the importance 
of collective human efforts in defending and diffusing 
cyber-attacks [20]. We therefore, propose that when 
individuals direct attention to cybersecurity they are 
more likely to engage in requested compliance 
behaviors. 
 
H3: Attention to cybersecurity has a positive (i.e., 
intensifies) relationship with compliance in protection. 
 
Table 2. Construct definitions 
Construct Definition 
Trust in 
Cybersecurity 
The degree to which an individual 
believes he or she is safeguarded 
from a cyber-attack [30] 
Cybersecurity 
Mindfulness 
A state of alertness and lively 
awareness in assessing threats to 
sensitive and confidential 
information [41] 
Cybersecurity 
Suspicion 
A person’s simultaneous state of 
cognitive activity, uncertainty, and 
perceived malintent about 
cybersecurity [6] 
Intention to 
Protect 
The user’s intention to continue 
protecting confidential information 
[46] 
Attention to 
Cybersecurity 
The process of directing our 
awareness to relevant stimuli while 
ignoring irrelevant stimuli in 
cybersecurity 
Compliance in 
Protection 
Behaviors that follow cybersecurity 
compliance policies for protecting 
confidential information and 
computing resources 
 
7. Proposed Method  
 
As this is research-in-progress, data will be 
collected in the near future in partnership with an 
organization in the southeastern United States. The 
research design for the full study will use a multi-
method approach comprised of a survey, eye-tracking 
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study and a field experiment to triangulate data in the 
context of a phishing e-mail attack.  
In partnership with our research site, training on 
phishing was provided to individuals in Fall of 2019, 
which included six heuristics or rules for individual to 
follow in identifying phishing emails: 1) ensuring the 
email header is legitimate 2) reviewing the domain 
name for legitimacy 3) reviewing for generic 
salutations 4) reviewing for spelling errors 5) looking 
for urgent requests for sensitive information, and 6) 
hovering and ensuring an embedded link or attached 
file is legitimate [35]. The organization digitally tracks 
all users that complete and do not complete the online 
phishing training. 
The survey is being developed through a literature 
review of the trust, mindfulness, suspicion, attention, 
and compliance literatures. When available, scales will 
be adapted to the context of trust in cybersecurity [29], 
mindfulness [41], suspicion [6], and attention [42]. 
Compliance behaviors will be operationalized with a 
scale with items such as “I report suspected phishing 
emails to the cybersecurity department” and “I do not 
click on links unless they are deemed safe (i.e., the link 
is noted as safe after hovering over it.)”. 
To test the model, we will survey a sample of those 
individuals requested to complete the training (i.e., 
those that did and did not). We will first measure trust 
in cybersecurity, cybersecurity mindfulness, 
cybersecurity suspicion, and intention to protect. Items 
for attention and compliance will be operationalized to 
the above noted generalized phishing rules and 
subsequent compliance behaviors. Validity and 
reliability will be verified following established IS 
guidelines [28].  
We will then recruit subjects for a follow up study 
from those that completed the survey and those that did 
not. Eye-tracking technology will be used to 
corroborate survey responses that individuals are in 
fact paying attention to phishing emails during the 
course of an experiment. The experiment will request 
individuals to identify potential phishing emails. Eye 
movements will be recorded to verify what an 
individual looks at when attempting to identify an 
email as malicious or legitimate.  
Finally, we will conduct a simulated phishing 
exercise to enact a breach at an organization with 
simulated phishing software. This software provides 
tracking mechanisms to obtain objective data on end 
user compliance behaviors. Data will then be 
triangulated from each phase of the research design. 
 
7.1 Preliminary Pilot Test Findings 
 
Since this is a research-in-progress study the full 
study has yet to be finalized and started. However, to 
test the preliminary instrument and research model, an 
initial pilot test was conducted with 87 respondents 
from a university in the South Eastern United States. 
The research design for the pilot test consisted of 
administering the pilot instrument to participants. 
Participants were first presented with items measuring 
trust in cybersecurity, cybersecurity mindfulness, 
cybersecurity suspicion, and intention to protect. 
Participants were then presented with the above noted 
generalized phishing rules and shown the application 
of the rules to example phishing emails. Subjects were 
then presented with items regarding attention and 
compliance that were operationalized to the six general 
phishing heuristics. The results of the initial pilot test 
were promising and provided some initial support for 
the factor structure and model. At the time of 
submission, the research team was working on 
finalizing the instrument based on the pilot test results.  
 
8. Analysis 
 
Analysis will be done in multiple steps to assess the 
validity of our research design. We will use structural 
equation modeling (SEM), EQS 6.4 a covariance-based 
SEM, for data analysis as the research model has latent 
variables. We will examine the measurement model to 
verify the instrument yields reliable and valid 
measurements. We will then assess the structural 
model to test the effects of dark side trust on attention 
to cybersecurity and compliance for protection. 
Additionally, we will assess the moderating effects of 
cybersecurity mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to 
protect between dark side trust in cybersecurity and 
attention to cybersecurity. Objective data obtained 
from eye-tracking and the field experiment will also be 
analyzed.     
 
9. Discussion 
 
9.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
Upon completion of this research-in-progress, this 
study contributes to cybersecurity and the ISec 
literature in several ways. While trust may be a key 
enabler in the use of cybersecurity systems, research 
has shown that dark side trust may result in negative 
consequences [12, 13]. By studying this concept in the 
context of cybersecurity we extend understanding of 
trust and its adverse impact on individuals and 
organizations to the ISec literature. Specifically, this 
study sheds light on how organizations can reduce 
mindless compliance due to dark side trust. The 
integrated model of dark side trust provides an 
explanatory framework for ISec literature to study the 
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degradation of compliance and combatting of dark side 
trust. 
We introduce mindfulness and suspicion into 
our model as a means to provide actionable 
countermeasures for dark side trust. Of particular 
interest is gaining insight into the construct of 
suspicion [6, 14], which in this study begins to 
understand its role in cyber-defense and compliance. 
We provide understanding into the moderating role of 
mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to protect and 
seek to understand how they affect attention to 
cybersecurity and subsequent compliance behaviors. 
Although, the prior empirical findings show 
the importance of attention, little work has extended 
our understanding of its role in compliance beyond 
information security warnings [1, 43, 45]. This 
research will provide further understanding of the 
interplay of trust and attention in cybersecurity as 
mechanisms to control compliance behavior.  
We also extend current research in 
cybersecurity regarding trust, as we reconceptualize it 
as a superordinate multi-dimensional construct 
comprised of trust in people, technology, and the 
organization. This new conceptualization will capture 
the different nature of trust in cybersecurity influenced 
by technology, people, and processes. New dimensions 
of trust in a specific technology are also conceptualized 
due to the unique context of cybersecurity. 
 Finally, IS research has been almost 
exclusively about the benefits of trust for 
organizations, individuals, online transactions and 
technology [2, 4, 15, 30, 33, 40]. The existing body of 
trust and information systems (IS) research has not 
extensively explored the dark side of trust and its 
negative consequences [34]. The dark side trust model 
in this study may provide researchers outside of the 
ISec community to study it in other contexts such as e-
commerce, virtual teams, and outsourcing 
relationships. 
 
9.2 Practical Implications 
 
This research-in-progress paper has several 
potential implications for practices ranging from 
training, design, and management. Training currently 
has been emphasized as a solution to increasing 
information security awareness. This paper 
conceptually proposes the idea that the effects of 
training, SETA, and notifications can be decreased 
since it may encourage trust. Designs of cybersecurity 
systems typically take a consistent iterative approach in 
issuing warnings, notifications, and calls to action and 
do not focus on failures of the function, system, or 
organization. This paper may provide the impetus to 
implement more malleable designs that engage the user 
to process decisions more mindfully through the levers 
of mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to protect. It 
may also encourage CISOs and cybersecurity 
managers to leverage the role of failure in training and 
communications (e.g., showing that cybersecurity 
function, system, and organization cannot prevent all 
cyber-attacks) as a cybersecurity countermeasure to 
combat dark side trust. Lastly, this paper shows that 
trust must be protected by the cybersecurity department 
and ensuring that individuals do not rely too heavily on 
the function, system, and organization for protection. 
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